LEGAL PRINCIPLES.

the bill broker and the money lender, not between the owner of the
bill and the money lender. The contracts are separate. There is
one contract between the bill broker and money lender, and another
contract between the bill broker and the owner of the bill, and there
are distinct rates of discount. The defendants dealt as principals,
and are responsible for the genuineness of the bill.
Secondly, though the defendants, having declined to endorse
and guarantee the bill, are not liable for the solvency of the parties
to the bill, they are liable for the genuineness of the instrument,
and for its being what it purported to be. Here, that which purported to be an acceptance of Van Notten & Co., on the credit
of which the defendants asked that the bill should be discounted,
was a forgery, and the bill was of no value. Therefore there was
a failure of consideration, and the plaintiffs are entitled to recover'
in this action.
Rule refused.
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LEGAL PRINCIPLES.
No. VI.
We read in our law books, as in our Latin grammars, of rules
and their exceptions. Now we mqy possibly make a distinction
between a rule and a principle of the law; but if we do, and consider rules as specific developments of principles, we shall find our
rules of little service, because we shall be obliged constantly to
look back to the developing principle to learn their extent and
force. And such rules must always be encumbered with exceptions.
so numerous and difficult to be understood, that we may Well doubt
the propriety of ever recognizing their existence in the law.
But most clearly a legal principle is not ordinarily a thing with
exceptions. Usually, like a principle of natural law, it works
uniformly and harmoniously. Yet every legal question is not influenced by every legal principle, just as the falling of a feather in an
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exhausted receiver is iu no w~y affected by the resistance of, the
atiq9aphere. The priwciple must be applicable to the .case, or it is
not to be applied.
".
Now, when one proposes what he calls a legal principle, and
attaches to it exceptions; or when we see that his supposed principle
requires exceptions; we at once doubt its correctnes. It is stated
in terms toe broad, or too narrow; or it is some single development of
a prnciple, in4ea4 of being the pribciple itself; or it is in part or in
full a mere interloper, having no real existence in the law. In this
view, we do not embrace all possible circumstances, and say that
there is absolutely no such thing as A legal principle which has an
exception; and it is probable that such an assertioft would be too
broad. A legislative enactment may lay down a proposition with
an exception; also the courts may establish a technical rule, in
the nature of a legal principle, and attach to it an. exception. And
so, in other particulars, the common law may have been moulded
into forms so unscientific is to develope exceptions.
One thing, at least, is quite certain, that he who studies most
accurately and deeply our noble system of jurisprudence, will find
in it fewest exceptions. And generally, if not universally, when a
true legal principle is correctly staed, it will be seen to operate
fully wherever, in its teems, it is applicable. A particular case may
be governed by it alone, or by it- and one or a dozen other legal
principles combined. That is, each case, in law, is governed by all
the legal principles which are applicable to it, exerting severally
and together their full influence. And as we read in the books of
natural science, that the centripetal and centrifugal forces, yoked
together, draw the earth round its orbit, while neither of them, separately, would take it in the same direction; so likewise, it is-often
in the law. The combined action of legal principles upon a case,
may work out a result to which no one principle alone would conduct; but this does not.establish an exception.
It follows, therefore, that a man, to be a sound lawyer, must 4e
familiar with all the principles of the law. If a part only are
within the compass of his knowledge, he may correctly decide upon
their application to a question before him, and yet decide wrongly in

